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Abstract 
Studies suggest that frontal alpha asymmetry is closely linked to psychological 
adjustment following stressful experiences, such that more left-sided frontal activation during 
symptom provocation might predict lower levels of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 
Here, we tested whether frontal asymmetry at rest and during exposure to neutral, negative, 
and trauma-related images would be associated with PTSD symptoms, and in particular with 
re-experiencing symptoms that are characteristic for this disorder. Symptom levels were 
assessed in trauma victims with (n=24) and without PTSD (n=15), using both retrospective 
measures and one-week ambulatory assessments with a diary and a smartphone. While resting 
frontal asymmetry was unrelated to all retrospective measures, left-sided activation in 
response to the negative picture correlated with lower levels of psychopathology. Left-sided 
activation in the trauma-related picture condition was more specifically associated with less 
emotionally intense intrusions and responses to viewing the picture, even when corrected for 
other symptoms of psychopathology. These effects tended to increase when participants with 
possible over-reporting tendencies were removed from the analyses. Moreover, trauma 
victims without PTSD (i.e., relatively more resilient individuals) displayed higher left-sided 
frontal activation in response to the negative picture, also when compared with a third group 
of healthy, trauma-free controls (n=15). Our findings suggest that state-dependent changes in 
frontal asymmetry could serve as a biological marker of PTSD symptoms and could 
eventually be used for diagnostic purposes or as a target for neuromodulation interventions. 
Future studies should establish whether this marker can serve as an early predictor of 
psychopathology in recently traumatized individuals.  
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Frontal EEG asymmetry during symptom provocation predicts subjective responses to 
intrusions in survivors with and without PTSD 
A small, yet non-trivial proportion of individuals who have experienced aversive life 
events develop trauma-related psychopathology, such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD). These trauma victims suffer from severe re-experiencing symptoms (e.g., intrusions, 
nightmares), avoidance of cues related to the trauma, altered mood and cognition, as well as 
exaggerated general arousal and reactivity (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Since 
the diagnosis of PTSD essentially depends on self-report (Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008), and its 
symptoms are only modestly related to objective trauma severity (Brewin, Andrews, & 
Valentine, 2000; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995; McNally & Robinaugh, 
2011), researchers and clinicians have been searching for biological markers of psychological 
adjustment to stress and trauma. The present study focused on so-called frontal asymmetry as 
a potential biological indicator of PTSD symptoms following trauma exposure.  
Frontal asymmetry is a widely studied electroencephalography (EEG) biomarker that 
refers to a hemispheric difference in alpha band power (typically 8-13 Hz) above the frontal 
cortex (right minus left). Given alpha’s inverse relationship with brain activity (e.g., 
Pfurtscheller, Stancak, & Neuper, 1996), more positive asymmetry scores are conventionally 
interpreted as reflecting more left-sided frontal brain activity (Coan & Allen, 2004). Measured 
across several minutes in resting individuals, this marker has been shown to possess high 
internal consistency, as well as good test-retest reliabilities (Towers & Allen, 2009). For 
decades, evidence has been accumulating to suggest that more left-sided frontal activity is 
associated with stronger approach motivation (e.g., Tomarken, Davidson, Wheeler, & Doss, 
1992), behavioural activation (e.g., Quaedflieg, Meyer, Smulders, & Smeets, 2015; Wacker, 
Chavanon, Leue, & Stemmler, 2008), enhanced affect and stress regulation (e.g., Koslov, 
Mendes, Pajtas, & Pizzagalli, 2011), psychological well-being (e.g., Urry et al., 2004), as well 
as with fewer symptoms of mood and anxiety disorders (Thibodeau, Jorgensen, & Kim, 
2006). Based on these findings (for reviews, see Coan & Allen, 2004; Harmon-Jones, Gable, 
& Peterson, 2010), frontal asymmetry has long been regarded as a promising of psychological 
resilience and (inversely) vulnerability to develop psychopathology.  
Despite these promising indications, the frontal asymmetry literature is inconsistent. For 
example, several studies failed to replicate the relationship between frontal asymmetry at rest 
with depression (e.g., Bruder et al., 1997; Reid, Duke, & Allen, 1998). Moreover, for PTSD, 
resting state frontal asymmetry has only little or even no predictive value across studies (for 
review, see Meyer, Smeets, et al., 2015). In part, these inconsistencies might be due to 
methodological differences affecting the sensitivity and reliability of the EEG measurement 
(e.g., length of recording and reference scheme; see Allen, Coan, & Nazarian, 2004; Allen & 
Reznik, 2015; Hagemann, 2004; Hagemann, Naumann, Thayer, & Bartussek, 2002). 
However, there also is an emerging consensus that frontal asymmetry has no ubiquitous and 
straightforward association with mental health outcomes (Allen & Reznik, 2015; Coan, Allen, 
& McKnight, 2006; Meyer, Smeets, et al., 2015), for two major reasons. First and most 
importantly, the associations with motivational or mental health outcomes appear to depend 
on the affective-motivational context during which frontal asymmetry is measured (Coan et 
al., 2006). For instance, several studies (e.g., Stewart, Coan, Towers, & Allen, 2014; Stewart, 
Coan, Towers, & Allen, 2011) have found that relatively lower left-sided activation in 
response to emotional challenges, but not left-sided activity at rest, predicted current or past 
levels of depression (for review, see Allen & Reznik, 2015). Similarly, for PTSD, Rabe and 
colleagues found an association between left-sided activation in response to viewing a 
trauma-related picture and fewer PTSD symptoms (Rabe, Beauducel, Zöllner, Maercker, & 
Karl, 2006; Rabe, Zöllner, Beauducel, Maercker, & Karl, 2008). Thus, in line with a so-called 
capability model of frontal asymmetry (see Coan et al., 2006), changes in frontal asymmetry 
that correlate with affective-motivational states appear to be associated with mental health 
outcomes, and more robustly so than frontal asymmetry at rest.  
Second, a frequent limitation in psychiatric research examining biomarkers like frontal 
asymmetry is that studies have focused on patient groups defined by their diagnostic status 
rather than their predominant symptoms (Nusslock, Walden, & Harmon-Jones, 2015; 
Schmidt, 2015). This argument is especially relevant to PTSD, since this syndrome comprises 
fear, mood, and general distress-related symptoms that are shared with other mood and 
anxiety disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Forbes et al., 2012; Zoellner, 
Pruitt, Farach, & Jun, 2014). Following the view that frontal asymmetry is closely linked to 
state and trait motivational direction (Nusslock et al., 2015), associations can thus be expected 
with mood and fear-related PTSD symptoms that are characterized by deficient approach and 
exaggerated withdrawal motivation, respectively.  
Meanwhile, motivational direction may play only a limited role in PTSD re-
experiencing symptoms, including dissociative amnesia and flashback memories, that are 
thought to be unique in PTSD (Brewin, 2011; Bryant, O’Donnell, Creamer, McFarlane, & 
Silove, 2011) and may depend on specific memory functions that make traumatic memories 
more or less accessible (e.g., Bisby, King, Brewin, Burgess, & Curran, 2010; Meyer et al., 
2013). Moreover, it has been proposed that anxious arousal is associated with relatively 
higher right parietal activation, whereas anxious apprehension would be associated with 
frontal asymmetry (Heller, Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997; Nitschke, Heller, Palmieri, & 
Miller, 1999). Accordingly, frontal asymmetry might not display specific relationships with 
PTSD symptoms related to hyper-arousal (e.g., the emotional intensity of traumatic memories, 
sweating, tachycardia; Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008), whereas associations with cognitive-
emotional reactions to the activation of traumatic memories can be expected (including 
exaggerated negative mood responses, and strong negative appraisal and rumination; Steil & 
Ehlers, 2000). Notably, these factors are believed to perpetuate and maintain PTSD symptoms 
in trauma victims (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999).   
Based on these considerations, the present study aimed to further investigate the 
association of frontal asymmetry with PTSD symptoms. We had a particular interest in 
exploring possible associations with re-experiencing symptoms and exaggerated emotional 
and cognitive reactions to the activation of trauma memories, which are relatively 
understudied components of this disorder (Brewin, 2015; see also Meyer, Otgaar, & Smeets, 
2015). For this purpose, we recruited trauma victims with PTSD and trauma victims without 
PTSD, and assessed PTSD symptoms with questionnaires, next to symptoms of depression, 
anxiety, and general psychopathology. Since ambulatory measurements might capture re-
experiencing symptoms more accurately than retrospective scales (for a review, see Chun, 
2016), we used diaries and smartphones to assess the occurrence of intrusive memories and 
how people reacted to them. In addition, we included a self-report scale to assess the tendency 
to over-report symptoms, which may obscure associations between frontal asymmetry and 
symptoms, particularly in analyses that rely on retrospection (Merckelbach & Smith, 2003). In 
line with Rabe, Beauducel, et al. (2006), frontal asymmetry was measured at rest, as well as in 
an emotion provocation task during which participants viewed a neutral, a negative, a 
positive, and a trauma-related picture. This set-up made it possible to contrast emotional 
conditions varying in valence (negative, positive) and idiosyncratic meaning (trauma-related, 
unrelated) with the neutral condition, which was intended as a baseline. Furthermore, the task 
allowed us to assess subjective responses to viewing the trauma-related image (i.e., emotional 
intensity, rumination, experience of a physical reaction, and distress).  
Our basic hypothesis was that relatively more left-sided frontal activity would be 
associated with fewer PTSD symptoms. Based on prior frontal asymmetry studies in PTSD 
(Meyer, Smeets, et al., 2015; Rabe, Beauducel, et al., 2006; Rabe et al., 2008), we explored 
this hypothesis for resting frontal asymmetry and for activation asymmetry in response to 
emotional provocation, expecting that asymmetry in the trauma-related and negative 
conditions would be the best predictors of PTSD symptoms. Since re-experiencing symptoms 
are thought to be specific to PTSD, we expected that potential associations with emotional 
and cognitive reactions to intrusions and to viewing the trauma-related picture would remain 
significant when corrected for symptoms of other disorders and for symptom over-reporting 
tendencies. Finally, for the purpose of group-level analyses, we also recruited a comparison 
group of healthy participants who had never been exposed to psychological trauma. Based on 
prior findings by Rabe, Beauducel, et al. (2006), we expected stronger left-sided activation in 
response to viewing the trauma picture in trauma-exposed participants without PTSD (i.e., 
relatively more resilient individuals), and weaker left-sided activation in participants with 
PTSD (i.e. non-resilient individuals), as compared with non-trauma exposed controls.  
Methods 
Participants  
Forty trauma survivors and 15 healthy participants without trauma exposure enrolled in 
this study. Table 1 provides an overview of the different types of trauma and their frequencies 
in the current sample. Demographic information and sample characteristics are summarized in 
Table 2. All participants were required to be aged between 18 and 60 years, be proficient in 
Dutch, and have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Trauma survivors were recruited via 
advertisements and among trauma victims seeking treatment at local psychiatric outpatient 
clinics (RIAGG Maastricht and Academic Anxiety Center Mondriaan/PsyQ in Maastricht, 
The Netherlands). For these participants, an inclusion criterion was the presence of a 
potentially traumatic experience (i.e., criterion A1 for PTSD according to the DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000), as established using a Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV for axis-1 disorders (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002). The 
presence of a PTSD diagnosis was neither an inclusion nor exclusion criteria. However, 
participants who had previously been diagnosed with PTSD and who had recovered (e.g., 
following treatment for PTSD) were excluded. Also, we excluded participants with traumatic 
experiences that referred to an extended time period (e.g., childhood abuse lasting several 
years) rather than distinct episodes, because our emotion provocation task required the 
identification of a distinct traumatic memory that could be activated with a single picture 
stimulus. Furthermore, the following exclusion criteria were employed: (1) traumatic 
experiences in past 6 months, (2) current psychotherapy, (3) current or lifetime diagnosis of 
psychotic or bipolar disorder, (4) current substance abuse or addiction, (5) psychoactive 
medication unless medication had been stable for three months, and (6) a history of head 
injury or neurological problems (e.g., epilepsy). Healthy participants without trauma-exposure 
were required to be free of any traumatic experiences, and in addition to the above-mentioned 
exclusion criteria, had to be free of any current axis-1 disorder according to the DSM-IV, as 
established during a Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 
1998). All participants provided written informed consent. This study was approved by the 
standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht 
University, The Netherlands.  
Recruitment and diagnostic procedures. To recruit eligible trauma survivors, we 
screened potential participants who were identified by the intake staff at local psychiatric 
outpatient clinics and respondents to the advertisements. Candidates were initially screened 
for inclusion and exclusion criteria by telephone, whereby biographical data, a short 
description and approximate date of traumatic experiences, reasons for past or present 
psychological, psychiatric, or medical treatments, medication, as well as the frequency of 
tobacco, alcohol and drug use were obtained. During this interview, participants were also 
comprehensively informed about all parts of this study. For candidates who reported at least 
one traumatic experience, eligibility for participation was further based on a SCID-I (First et 
al., 2002), which was administered during an individual diagnostic session by the intake staff 
at the psychiatric outpatient clinics, or by Master or PhD level psychology students who had 
previously received an extensive SCID training. Next to recording the presence of axis-1 
disorders, this interview was used to verify the presence of a traumatic experience according 
to the PTSD criterion A1 in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000)1, and to 
record trauma type and frequency, as well as the time passed since the traumatic 
experience(s).  
Among 196 candidates who were referred from the psychiatric clinics, reasons for 
exclusion were: index traumatic experiences that did not fulfil DSM-IV criteria or referred to 
an extended traumatic period (n=49), not fulfilling the age criterion (n=37), current 
psychotherapy (n=37), diagnosed substance abuse or addiction (n=18), PTSD in remission 
(n=5), neurological or medical problems (n=4), and lacking proficiency in Dutch (n=2). 
Finally, 23 declined their participation or discontinued the contact, leaving 21 who enrolled in 
the trauma survivor groups.  
In addition, at least 133 individuals responded to the advertisements, 76 indicating the 
presence of a possible traumatic experience (a small part of these data were lost and are 
excluded from these statistics). Among this latter group, reasons for exclusion were: index 
traumatic experiences that did not fulfil DSM-IV criteria or referred to an extended traumatic 
period (n=10), the age criterion (n=9), neurological or medical problems (n=5), psychotic or 
bipolar disorders (n=2), substance abuse (n=1), and lacking proficiency in Dutch (n=1). 
Finally, 29 declined their participation or discontinued the contact, leaving 19 who enrolled in 
the trauma survivor groups.  
                                                          
1 As can be seen in Table 1, the large majority of included participants also fulfilled criteria 
A1 of the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Potential participants who did not report a traumatic experience were considered for 
participation if they could be matched to one of the trauma-exposed participants in terms of 
gender, age (difference < 4 years), and highest completed education level according to the 
Dutch system (lower secondary, upper secondary, post-secondary, or higher education). They 
were invited to a telephone interview with the MINI (Sheehan et al., 1998) to establish 
eligibility for the healthy non-trauma exposed group. 
Diagnostic groups. For group analyses, we divided the trauma survivors into those with 
a PTSD diagnosis and those without, based on the SCID-I outcomes. One participant 
diagnosed with PTSD endorsed a considerable number of items on the Structured Inventory of 
Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS; total score = 27; > 3 SD higher than the sample mean; 
cf. Table 2), while performing below chance level on a visual search task (a contextual cueing 
paradigm with non-emotional search displays; Meyer et al., 2013; data not included here) 
despite repeated instructions (accuracies below the 50% chance level in 23/30 blocks). As this 
response pattern is indicative of deliberate symptom over-reporting and task under-
performance, this particular participant was removed from all analyses. Among the remaining 
participants diagnosed with PTSD (n = 24), some also had diagnoses of a current mood (n = 
11) and/or anxiety disorder (n = 7), somatoform disorder (n = 3), eating disorder (n = 1), 
ADHD (n = 1), a mood disorder in partial or complete remission (n = 5), and/or an eating 
disorder in remission (n = 2). Among the trauma survivors without PTSD (i.e., a relatively 
more resilient subgroup; n = 15), some also were diagnosed with a mood disorder (n = 1), 
anxiety disorder (n = 3), or an anxiety disorder in remission (n = 1).  
Incomplete data. One participant diagnosed with PTSD did not return for the second 
session, and one participant in the healthy control group terminated participation prematurely. 
These two individuals had to be excluded from correlational analyses regarding symptoms of 
psychopathology. However, we retained their EEG and response data for group-level 
analyses. Data from two questionnaires (BDI-II and SIMS) from one other participant 
(healthy control participant) were missing, as were the data from one questionnaire (SIMS) of 
one trauma victim with PTSD.  
Trauma-related symptoms 
Retrospective assessment. We used the PTSD Checklist Civilian version (PCL; 
Blanchard, JonesAlexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996). It consists of 17 items that require 
the respondent to indicate the frequency of experiencing DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) symptoms of PTSD in the past month on 5-point scales (1 = Not at all, 5 = 
Extremely). The sum score (α = .95) serves as a total PTSD severity score. In parallel, we 
used the self-reported PTSD Symptom Scale (PSS-SR; Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 
1993), which consists of four Re-Experiencing items (α = .87), seven Avoidance items (α = 
.85), and six Hyper-Arousal items, (α = .84; total score α=.93).  
As a self-report measure of cognitive and affective responses to the occurrence of 
intrusions, we used the Response to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ) developed by Clohessy 
and Ehlers (1999) and adapted in Dutch by Smets, Wessel, Schreurs, and Raes (2012). It 
consists of two subscales, whereby the first assesses the frequency of ruminating about the 
content of intrusions on 8 items (e.g., “I dwell on how the event could have been prevented”; α 
= .81), requiring responses on a 4-point scale (1 = never, 4 = all the time). The second 
subscale measures negative appraisals of intrusions (e.g., “The fact that I experience 
intrusions means that I am going crazy”; 6 items; α = .81), on 7-point scales (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Responses are summed to provide scores for each subscale.  
Ambulatory assessment – intrusion diary. We measured the occurrence of intrusions, 
defined as sudden, involuntary memories of traumatic experiences, and affective reactions to 
intrusions during a period of seven days using a pen-and-paper diary. Similar to the diary 
method often used in experimental analogue studies (see Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004; 
Meyer et al., 2013), the diary had two partitions. The first consisted of a structured page for 
each day in which participants noted the occurrence of intrusions, next to the time of waking 
up and going to bed, and the overall level of stress experienced during the day (not counting 
stress caused by the intrusions) on a scale from 0 (not stressful) to 100 (extremely stressful). 
There also was free space left for notes about any experiences of the day that were out of the 
normal range (optional). Participants were instructed to fill out the diary whenever an 
intrusion occurred, and at least twice a day. In the second partition of the diary, participants 
were asked to provide details about each intrusion that they had recorded. In particular, they 
were asked to write down the content and trigger of the intrusion (to verify that the memory 
was involuntary and trauma-related), and whether it was primarily based on images, thoughts, 
or both. Furthermore, they were asked how distressing the intrusion was, how intense the 
elicited emotions were, and whether they had any physical reaction associated with it (e.g., 
laughing, sweating, tachycardia), all rated on scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 
(extremely).  
For our analyses, we computed the number of intrusions with an image component and 
those with a thought component, as well as the total frequency of intrusions. Frequency scores 
were logarithm transformed prior to the analyses to correct for their strongly skewed 
distribution (i.e., ln [1 + #intrusions]).  Distress, intensity, and physical reaction scores were 
averaged across all recorded intrusions for the analyses (zero was entered when no intrusion 
had occurred).  
Ambulatory assessment – smartphone. Complementary to the diary, we provided 
participants with a smartphone that was used to measure the degree to which intrusions 
changed affect levels referenced to baseline over a seven-days period. In order to measure 
baseline affect levels, participants received five messages throughout each day and were 
prompted to fill out an Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989); a single item 
consisting of a 9×9 space, whereby respondents had to select a single field that best reflected 
their current level of valence on the horizontal axis (range: 1=unpleasant feelings, 9=pleasant 
feelings) and arousal on the vertical axis (range: 1=sleepiness, 9=high arousal). The timing of 
the messages was tailored to the typical waking hours of each participant, such that the first 
and last messages were sent between 30 and 90 min after the time of getting up, and between 
90 and 30 min before going to sleep, respectively. The remaining three messages were equally 
distributed throughout the day with ±30 min random variation.  
Whenever participants experienced an intrusion, they were asked to indicate this via the 
smartphone by following a link that was provided to them. For ethical reasons, we explicitly 
allowed our participants to omit reporting an intrusion via the smartphone if this would be 
experienced as too stressful, or when the intrusion occurred at night (e.g., waking up from a 
nightmare). Upon following the link, they were prompted to fill out an Affect Grid. After 15 
and 30 min, they received two follow-up messages with another Affect Grid. At the same 
time, all baseline measurements were suppressed for a period of three hours.  
For the analyses, we calculated the mean valence and arousal levels across all weekly 
baseline measurements per participant. Moreover, we averaged the valence and arousal levels 
following an intrusion, separately for the immediate, +15 min, and the +30 min timings. 
Finally, we derived valence and arousal reactivity scores for each timing by subtracting the 
weekly baseline from the values at each timing. Higher reactivity scores reflect relatively 
increased valence and arousal in response to intrusions.   
Resting state EEG measurement 
In line with the procedure described in Tomarken, Davidson, Wheeler, and Kinney 
(1992), the resting state EEG measurement consisted of eight 1-min blocks with a fixed 
interval of 20 s between blocks. In half of the blocks, participants were instructed to keep 
their eyes open and look straight ahead at a fixation cross, and in the other half participants 
had to keep their eyes closed. The beginning of each block was signalled by a single tone, and 
the end by a double tone. The order of open- and closed-eyes conditions was randomized for 
each participant, whereby each condition could not occur more than twice consecutively.  
Emotion provocation task 
We employed an emotion provocation task similar to the one described previously by 
Rabe, Beauducel, et al. (2006). This task consisted of four 2 min blocks, during which 
participants viewed a still image from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). Between the blocks, a 30 s break was inserted. The stimuli 
consisted of one neutral (a spoon; IAPS #7004), one positive (two bunnies; IAPS #1750), one 
negative (a barking pit bull; IAPS 1300), and one individually chosen trauma-related image. 
The order of the first three blocks was randomized, while all participants viewed the trauma-
related image last.  
Table 1 lists the IAPS pictures that were chosen as individualized trauma-related image 
for the emotion provocation task. Following the trauma-related image, participants were asked 
to indicate the degree to which the image reminded them of their own traumatic experience on 
an 11-point scale (0=not at all, 10=very much). Moreover, using three similar 11-point scales, 
they had to indicate how much the picture made them ruminate, how intense the emotions 
where if they had been reliving the traumatic experience, and whether they noticed an 
associated physical reaction (e.g., laughing, sweating, tachycardia).  
--- insert Table 1 about here --- 
 Table 1. Frequency of different trauma types and individualized trauma-related IAPS pictures for the emotion provocation task.  
Index trauma Frequency Trauma-related picture for emotion provocation paradigm 
(International Affective Picture System #)  
Witness 10 3016, 3060, 3216, 6313, 6315, 9410, 9903 
Death of a close one A 7 2053, 3216, 3225, 3230, 6570, 9911 
Threat of violence 6 6313, 6315, 6321, 6560, 6561 
Rape 5 6313, 6315, 6560 
Physical abuse  4 3181, 6313, 6315 
Armed robbery 4 6313, 6321, 6370 
Other life-threatening 3 1726, 6321, 9903 
Control group 15 2053, 3016, 3216, 6313, 6315, 6321, 6370, 6560, 6561, 9903 
Note. A While fulfilling criterion A1 for trauma exposure according to the DSM-IV, it is unclear for a minority (n=3) whether they also fulfil 
DSM-V criteria for trauma exposure (i.e., death may not have been violent or accidental). 
 Physiological recordings and data reduction 
In line with published guidelines (Keil et al., 2014; Pivik et al., 1993), we measured 
EEG using an electrode cap with Ag/AgCl electrodes positioned according to the 
International 10-20 system (American Electroencephalographic Society, 1994) at the 
locations FZ, F3, F4, F7, F8, FC3, FC4, CZ, C3, C4, T7, T8, PZ, P3, P4, P7, P8, PO3, PO4, 
PO7, PO8, and A2. By means of a BrainAmp EEG amplifier (Brain Products GmbH, 
Germany), signals were sampled continuously at 250 Hz, referenced online to the left mastoid 
(A1), bandpass filtered (0.1–35 Hz), and stored. An electrode at AFz served as signal ground. 
In addition, electrooculogram (EOG) electrodes were applied above and below the right eye 
and at the outer canthi of both eyes to measure vertical and horizontal eye movements. All 
electrode impedances were kept below 5 kOhm with homologous scalp electrodes being 
within 1 kOhm of each other. 
Resting state frontal asymmetry. In line with prior frontal asymmetry studies (for a 
review, see Allen et al., 2004; Meyer et al., 2014b; Quaedflieg et al., 2015), frontal 
asymmetry scores were determined according to the following data reduction procedure 
(BrainVision Analyzer 2.0 software; Brain Products, Germany). First, all EEG data were re-
referenced offline to the average of A1 and A2 and band-pass filtered from 1 to 30 Hz. Next, 
each 1-min block from the resting state measurement was divided in 2-s epochs (75% 
overlap). Epochs were defined as artefact contaminated (e.g., by eye movement or muscle 
activity) and removed when vertical EOG or EEG activity exceeded thresholds of ± 200 and ± 
75 μV, respectively. On average 70.5% (range = 12–100; SD = 21.2) of eyes-open and 97.8% 
(range = 82–100; SD = 3.8) of eyes-closed epochs were artefact free. Then, we derived the 
power density for each retained epoch using fast Fourier transformation (FFT) with a 100% 
Hanning window and calculated weighted averages across artefact-free epochs, separately for 
the eyes-open and eyes-closed conditions.  
Following the procedure described in Quaedflieg et al. (2015), we determined frontal 
asymmetry scores based on each participant’s individual alpha peak frequency (IAF). In 
contrast to relying on the standard alpha band (e.g., 8-13 Hz), this approach takes the large 
inter-individual variability in IAF into account and thereby increases the signal-to-noise ratio.  
IAF was defined as the dominant frequency rhythm between 5 and 15 Hz at the midline 
posterior electrode (Pz) on the weighted average of the 4 min of resting eyes closed data (see 
Doppelmayr, Klimesch, Pachinger, & Ripper, 1998; Klimesch, 1999). The sample average 
IAF was 9.81 Hz (range: 7.3 – 12.2, SD = 0.97). The IAF bandwidth was defined as the 20% 
range above and below the IAF (i.e., on average from 7.85 to 11.77 Hz), largely overlapping 
with the standard alpha band between 8 and 13 Hz. Alpha asymmetry scores were calculated 
by subtracting the log-transformed alpha power density values at left from right frontal 
electrodes (i.e., ln[right] – ln[left]), and then averaged across eyes-open and eyes-closed 
blocks.  
The analyses concentrate on alpha power asymmetry in the widely used lateral frontal 
(F8, F7), midfrontal (F4, F3), and midline frontocentral leads (FC4, FC3). Each of these 
electrode pairs has been used in prior studies (cf. Gordon, Palmer, & Cooper, 2010; Rabe, 
Beauducel, et al., 2006; Wahbeh & Oken, 2013) to determine frontal asymmetry in PTSD 
samples (for review, see Meyer, Smeets, et al., 2015). Because we had identical hypotheses 
for each of these sites, we calculated a composite frontal asymmetry index (i.e., the mean of 
ln[F8], ln[F4], ln[FC4] – mean of ln[F7], ln[F3], ln[FC3]), in order to reduce the number of 
statistical analyses and consequently the probability of Type 1 errors. Using this metric, we 
found high to excellent internal consistency across the eight resting state blocks (α = .89) and 
across the four emotion induction blocks (α = .86)2. To examine whether the asymmetry 
effects were specific to frontal sites, we calculated a similar asymmetry index for parietal sites 
(mean of ln[P8], ln[P4] – mean of ln[P7], [P3]).  
Frontal activation asymmetry during emotion provocation. In the same manner as 
for the resting state measurements, average power densities were calculated for the four 2-min 
blocks of the emotion provocation task. On average, for the 2-min blocks (237 epochs) with 
neutral, positive, negative, and reminder pictures, we retained respectively 63.6% (SD = 
27.6), 60.3% (SD = 28.2), 64.2% (SD = 27.5), and 59.0% (SD = 27.5) of the epochs after 
artefact rejection. These percentages did not vary as a function of group, or group by phase, 
all ps > .21. For the purpose of correlational analyses, we calculated activation asymmetry 
scores (similar to Rabe, Beauducel, et al., 2006) by subtracting each individual’s resting state 
frontal asymmetry from the asymmetry scores during each of the emotion induction blocks 
(for details on this decision, see Results). 
Self-report scales to control for individual differences 
Common symptoms of psychopathology. To check for the specificity of potential 
findings to trauma-related symptoms, we used the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Boulet & 
Boss, 1991) as an overall measure of psychopathology. It consists of 53 items that describe a 
variety of psychological complaints and require respondents to indicate the degree of distress 
caused by them on 5-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). For our 
analyses, we used the mean score across all items (α=.98). Moreover, the trait subscale of the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) and the revised Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) were employed to measure stable individual 
                                                          
2 For asymmetry scores that are derived from power density in the standard alpha band (8–13 
Hz), we found almost identical internal consistencies (resting: α = .89, induction: α = .88). 
Moreover, we repeated the main correlation analyses reported in Table 4 with these scores, 
finding basically the same results (see Table S2, supplementary materials).  
differences in anxiety and depression levels, respectively. The STAI consists of two 20-item 
subscales that tap into state and trait anxiety, using 4-point scales (range: 1-4). The BDI-II 
consists of 21 items that screen for depression and are rated on 4-point scales (range 0-3). The 
sum scores of the two scales, were used to quantify trait anxiety (α=.96) and depression 
(α=.92), respectively.  
Symptom validity. To assess symptom over-reporting tendencies, the Structured 
Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS; Merckelbach & Smith, 2003; Smith & 
Burger, 1997), consisting of 75 true-false statements, was used. The statements represent rare 
or atypical symptoms of different clinical conditions, namely Low Intelligence, Affective 
Disorders, Neurological Impairment, Psychosis, and Amnesia. One Low Intelligence item was 
removed from the scoring because the correct answer changed in the course of the study 
(“Beatrix is the Queen of the Netherlands.”). Most commonly, the SIMS is used as a tool to 
detect malingering by means of cut-off scores. When used as a dimensional measure, studies 
have shown that non-extreme scores are positively related to genuine levels of 
psychopathology (e.g., Dandachi-FitzGerald, Ponds, Peters, & Merckelbach, 2011). 
Therefore, next to using the total SIMS score (α = .82), we also used the Low Intelligence 
subscale (e.g., “I am unable to count from 20 to 1 without making a mistake.”) and the 
Psychosis subscale (e.g., “When I hear voices, it feels as if my teeth were leaving my mouth.”), 
both of which have no conceptual overlap with the variables of interest in our study and have 
been shown to discriminate well between honest and feigning responders (Dandachi-
FitzGerald et al., 2011). Both subscales had very low internal consistencies (psychosis: α = 
.11; low intelligence α = .07), which is likely due to the presence of zero-variance items 
(items that none of the participants endorsed), and which is in line with the view that these 
scales capture item-unspecific response tendencies rather than an underlying psychological 
construct.  
Handedness and current mood. We included the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(EHI; Oldfield, 1971) to determine motor lateralization (i.e., handedness). Finally, we 
included a measure of current mood prior to the resting state measurement, using the state 
version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). This scale consists of two 10-item subscales with adjectives, respectively describing 
Positive Affect (e.g., interested; α=.87) and Negative Affect (e.g., distressed; α=.94), and 
requiring responses on 5-point Likert scales (1=very slightly or not at all; 5=Extremely). Items 
on each scale are summed, and higher scores indicate higher current positive and negative 
affect, respectively.  
Procedure 
Session 1. Trauma-exposed participants were invited to two individual lab sessions, 
separated by an interval of eight days. The first session was scheduled in the afternoon in 
order to reduce possible diurnal fluctuations in frontal asymmetry (Velo, Stewart, Hasler, 
Towers, & Allen, 2012). Participants were instructed beforehand to refrain from drugs and 
alcohol for 24h, and from heavy physical activities, smoking, or drinking coffee immediately 
prior to participation. Upon arrival, they were seated in an electrically shielded and 
soundproof cabin and were given a word learning task (data not included here). Next, the 
EOG and EEG electrodes were prepared, while participants filled out questionnaires 
(including biographical data, EHI) on the computer. Following electrode preparation, the 
participants were left alone in the cabin and were given the trauma screening form and a form 
asking about typical waking hours (in order to program the diary app). When they had 
completed them, the experimenter checked the responses and briefly discussed the trauma 
screening form with the participant in order to select a trauma-relevant picture for the 
reminder task. Then, participants performed a recall test from the word learning task. 
Participants were later shown the raw EEG and EOG signals to demonstrate common sources 
of artefacts (e.g., body and eye movements), filled out the PANAS, and underwent the resting 
state measurement. Afterwards, they performed an unrelated, non-emotional visual search 
task lasting approximately 30 min, followed by the emotion provocation task. Finally, they 
were given the smartphone and the diary that they were to complete for seven days (starting 
the day after Session 1) and received extensive written and verbal instruction on their use. 
Moreover, they were given a demonstration with the smartphone of how to report an intrusion 
and fill out the Affect Grids.  
Session 2. One week later, participants returned the smartphone and the diary, and the 
experimenter checked the diary for correct use and readability together with the participant. 
This was followed by administration of a questionnaire battery on the computer that included 
the PCL, PSS-SR, RIQ, BSI, STAI, BDI-II, and the SIMS. Finally, the participants were fully 
debriefed and received 75€ as a compensation for their participation.  
Healthy control group. The healthy controls were invited to a single laboratory session. 
The procedure was similar to the first session of the trauma-exposed group, except that these 
participants were given the same questionnaire battery that trauma-exposed participants 
completed in session 2 immediately following the emotion induction task. No ambulatory 
diary measures were taken in this group. These participants received 30€ to compensate them 
for participating.  
Statistical analyses 
Single extreme values in resting and emotion provocation EEG asymmetries were 
replaced such that their deviance from the sample mean equated 2.5 times the sample SD (i.e., 
Winsorizing; Rivest, 1994). We used ANOVA and t-tests to test differences between the 
diagnostic groups in our sample. Our main analyses address the relationship between frontal 
asymmetry and PTSD symptoms using Pearson product-moment correlations and partial 
correlation analyses. Furthermore, we used repeated-measures ANCOVA to test whether 
PTSD symptoms modulated frontal asymmetry scores and vice versa. When sphericity 
assumptions for ANCOVA were violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p values are reported 
along with the respective epsilon and uncorrected degrees of freedom. Alpha was set at .05 
(two-tailed). Where applicable, follow-up pairwise comparisons were performed, and in those 
cases we consistently report Bonferroni-corrected p values. In the correlation analyses, we 
corrected alpha for multiple testing. For an optimal balance between the risk of Type-I and 
Type-II errors, we used the Bonferroni tool from Simple Interactive Statistical Analysis 
(SISA; www.quantitativeskills.com/sisa/calculations/bonfer.htm), which takes the average 
correlation among dependent variables into account.  
Results 
Sample characteristics 
Retrospective symptom assessment. Symptoms of PTSD, anxiety, depression, and 
overall psychopathology are summarized in Table 2. There were no group differences in age, 
gender ratio, handedness, and time since the index trauma among trauma-exposed 
participants. While there were no group differences in state positive affect in session 1, we did 
find group differences in state negative affect. Pairwise comparisons showed that participants 
diagnosed with PTSD had higher negative affect levels prior to the EEG resting state 
measurement than the other two groups, ps <= .01, whereas the no-PTSD group did not differ 
from healthy controls, p > .99.  
--- insert Table 2 about here --- 
The analyses further confirm the allocation of participants into three groups, with higher 
PCL total scores in participants with PTSD compared with trauma-exposed participants 
without PTSD (pairwise p < .001), who had higher scores than healthy controls, p = .022. 
Similarly, pairwise comparisons indicated that the PTSD group scored higher on PSS-SR Re-
Experiencing and Avoidance symptoms than the two other groups, ps < .001, while there was 
no difference between trauma-exposed participants without PTSD and healthy controls, ps > 
.26. For PSS-SR hyper-arousal symptoms, pairwise comparisons indicate significant 
differences between all groups, ps < .01, with highest scores in the PTSD group and lowest in 
the healthy controls. For the STAI-T, BDI-II, and BSI scores, but also of the SIMS total 
scores, significantly higher scores were found in the PTSD group compared to the other two 
groups, all ps < .01, while there were no differences between trauma-exposed participants 
without PTSD and healthy controls, all ps > .11. Importantly, however, no group differences 
emerged for the SIMS Psychosis and Low Intelligence subscales.  
Finally, significant group differences also emerged on the RIQ Rumination subscale, F 
(2,49) = 7.59, p = .001, ηp2 = .24, and on the RIQ Negative Appraisal subscale, F = 19.33, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .44. PTSD patients had higher rumination scores (M = 19.7, SD = 4.2) than 
controls (M = 13.8, SD = 3.5), p = .001, while the no-PTSD group (M = 16.7, SD = 5.8) did 
not differ significantly from the other groups, ps > .15. Furthermore, participants with PTSD 
scored higher on negative appraisal of intrusions (M = 18.6, SD = 3.4) compared to the no-
PTSD group (M = 13.5, SD = 3.3) and to controls (M = 13.0, SD = 2.0), ps <.001, with no 
difference between no-PTSD and control participants, p > .99.  
Table 2. Symptoms of PTSD, anxiety, depression, and overall psychopathology in the current sample. 
 Group  Pairwise comparisons (p) 
Method PTSD No-PTSD Healthy controls Test PTSD > 
No-PTSD 
No-PTSD > 
controls 
n 24 15 15    
% female 75.0 66.7 93.3 Χ² (2) = 3.28    
Age  30.7 (9.9) 35.0 (10.3) 28.9 (8.7) F (2,51) = 1.58   
Handedness (EHI)  76.6 (36.6) 44.1 (80.5) 80.0 (28.7) F (2,51) = 2.39   
PANAS – PA State 27.5 (7.7) 32.0 (7.6) 28.1 (7.2) F (2,51) = 1.77   
PANAS – NA State 20.2 (8.3) 13.5 (6.4) 11.5 (1.6) F (2,51) = 9.54*** .010 >.99 
Months since index trauma 76.4 (74.1) 78.7 (37.0) - t (37) = -0.1   
PCL score 48.1 (10.3) 29.8 (13.3) 19.4 (2.3) F (2,49) = 38.96*** <.001 .022 
PSS-SR total score 24.2 (8.7) 9.5 (7.2) 2.6 (2.3) F (2,49) = 44.70*** <.001 .033 
 Re-Experiencing 5.7 (2.9) 2.2 (2.4) 0.6 (1.0) F (2,49) = 21.59*** <.001 .26 
 Avoidance 8.3 (4.9) 2.4 (2.7) 0.5 (1.2) F (2,49) = 22.93*** <.001 .51 
 Hyper-arousal 10.2 (3.5) 4.9 (3.0) 1.4 (1.4) F (2,49) = 42.18*** <.001 .006 
STAI-T 54.3 (8.9) 38.6 (13.2) 32.8 (4.7) F (2,49) = 25.62*** <.001 .32 
BDI-II 23.3 (9.5) 8.3 (9.3) 2.1 (3.4) F (2,48) = 30.69*** <.001 .16 
BSI score 1.27 (0.59) 0.56 (0.61) 0.16 (0.14) F (2,49) = 21.53*** <.001 .12 
SIMS total score 10.8 (5.1) 6.1 (4.4) 3.2 (2.6) F (2,47) = 13.03*** .007 .29 
 Low Intelligence  1.0 (0.8) 0.8 (0.9) 0.5 (1.0) F (2,47) = 1.15   
 Psychosis 0.5 (0.7) 0.3 (0.5) 0.4 (0.7) F (2,47) = 0.54   
Note. EHI = Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect; 
PCL = PTSD Checklist (Civilian version); PSS-SR = PTSD Symptom Scale – Self-report; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory II; BSI = Brief Symptom Inventory; SIMS = Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology.  
*** p < .001. 
  
Ambulatory assessment. Table 3 summarizes the intrusions recorded in the diary by 
the trauma-exposed participants, separately for those diagnosed with and without PTSD. As 
could be expected, participants with PTSD reported more intrusions than trauma-exposed 
participants without PTSD, irrespective of whether the intrusions had an image- or a thought 
component, all ts (df = 36) >.2.94, ps < .01. The former group also reported higher levels of 
distress (t = 3.14, p = .006), emotional intensity (t = 2.52, p = .020), and physical reactions to 
the intrusions (t = 2.27, p = .033). Moreover, participants with PTSD tended to report lower 
mean sleep quality (t = -2.03, p = .050) and higher levels of diurnal stress unrelated to the 
intrusions (t = 2.93, p = .006).  
--- insert Table 3 about here --- 
Table 3. Intrusion diary responses.  
Method  PTSD (n = 23) No-PTSD (n = 15) 
Diary intrusions Total  6.22 (5.14) 2.40 (3.04) 
 Image-based  4.13 (4.17) 1.33 (1.40) 
 Thought-based  4.87 (4.12) 2.07 (3.08) 
Affective responses Distress 70.1 (15.7) 39.1 (36.2) 
 Intensity 65.2 (20.4) 19.6 (35.9) 
 Physical reaction 51.1 (24.1) 27.4 (35.4) 
Diurnal characteristics Sleep quality 60.6 (14.1) 71.3 (18.2) 
 Diurnal stress level 47.7 (13.0) 33.8 (16.1) 
 
In all trauma-exposed participants, the (log-transformed) frequency of intrusions in the 
diary corresponded with the number of intrusions that were recorded in parallel via the 
smartphone, r (38) = .54, p < .001. In total, 27 of the 38 trauma-exposed participants (18 
diagnosed with PTSD) reported at least one intrusion using the smartphone and filled out the 
corresponding Affect Grids. Among this subgroup, PTSD symptoms tended to correlate with 
lower weekly valence scores (PCL score r = -.36, p = .064; PSS-SR total r = -.39, p = .047), 
but not with arousal scores (largest r = -.26, p = 19). Valence and arousal scores did not differ 
significantly between those diagnosed with and without PTSD, all ts (25) < 0.89, ps > .38.  
In order to assess possible interactions of PTSD symptoms with the time course of 
valence scores, we performed a repeated measures ANCOVA for all trauma-exposed 
participants (irrespective of their diagnostic status) with time (3: immediate, +15 min, +30 
min) as within-subjects factor and mean weekly valence level and PCL total score as 
covariates. This revealed that the factor time interacted both with PCL scores, F (2,48) = 4.56, 
ε = .64, p = .033, ηp2 = .16, and with weekly valence levels, F (2,48) = 4.17, ε = .64, p < .041, 
ηp2 = .15. A similar interaction of time with PTSD symptoms emerged when PSS-SR scores 
were entered instead of PCL scores, F (2,48) = 5.18, ε = .66, p = .022, ηp2 = .18. Moreover, it 
also emerged at trend-level in a repeated measures ANOVA where we entered diagnostic 
group instead of continuous PTSD symptoms (2: PTSD, no-PTSD) as between-subjects 
factor, F (2,50) = 2.95, ε = .64, p < .086, ηp2 = .11. The nature of this interaction can be seen 
in Figure 1. Valence reactivity scores differed between the diagnostic groups only 
immediately following an intrusion, t (25) = -2.3, p = .030, but not 15 or 30 min later, all ps > 
.12. Meanwhile, similar ANCOVAs for arousal levels did not reveal any significant main or 
interaction effects involving time (all ps > .09) or PTSD symptoms (all ps > .37). Only mean 
weekly arousal levels tended to be associated with arousal levels following an intrusion, F 
(1,24) = 3.69, p = .067, ηp2 = .13.  
--- insert Figure 1 about here --- 
 Figure 1. Valence (left panel) and arousal (right panel) levels during one week (Average) and 
at three time-points following intrusive memories.  
 
Emotion provocation task. Subjective responses to the trauma-related picture during 
the emotion provocation task are summarized in Figure 2. ANOVAs comparing the three 
groups revealed significant group differences on all five included items, Fs (2,51) > 7.47, ps 
<= .001, ηp2s > .22. Importantly, pairwise comparisons revealed that trauma-exposed 
individuals with and without PTSD similarly indicated that the picture reminded them of their 
own traumatic experience, p=.33, and both groups scored significantly higher than the 
trauma-free controls, both ps < .001. Furthermore, both trauma-exposed groups tended to 
score higher on all other items compared to the trauma-free control group, all ps <= .05, while 
the scores did not differ between participants with and without PTSD, all ps > .28.  
--- insert Figure 2 about here --- 
 Figure 2. Subjective responses to the trauma-related image in the emotion provocation task.  
 
Frontal asymmetry 
Group differences. Mean frontal asymmetry scores per group are displayed in Figure 3. 
At first, we ran a 5 (phase: resting, neutral, positive, negative, trauma-related) by 3 (group: 
PTSD, no-PTSD, controls) repeated measures ANOVA on frontal asymmetry scores. This 
revealed a significant phase by group interaction, F (8,204) = 2.62, p = .010, ηp2 = .09, as 
well as a group main effect, F (2,51) = 6.00, p = .005, ηp2 = .19, in the absence of a main 
effect for phase, F (4,204) = 1.20, p = .31, ηp2 = .02. To explore the nature of the phase by 
group interaction, we ran follow-up ANOVAs per phase, yielding a significant group effect 
during the resting state phase, F (2,51) = 10.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .30. Here, frontal asymmetry 
scores did not differ between the two trauma-exposed groups, p = .29, but, unexpectedly, both 
of these groups had more left-sided activity compared to the healthy control group (ps <.004).  
In contrast, different patterns emerged in the emotion provocation task. We found 
significant group effects for neutral and negative picture viewing, F (2,51) = 3.84, p = .028, 
ηp2 = .13, and F = 8.46, p = .001, ηp2 = .25, respectively. In these two conditions, trauma-
exposed participants without PTSD (i.e., relatively more resilient individuals) had higher left-
sided activity than participants with PTSD, ps < .024, and, in the negative picture condition, 
they also had higher scores than control participants, p = .027. Meanwhile, there were no 
group differences in the positive picture condition, F = 1.46, p = .24, ηp2 = .05, and, against 
our expectations, neither were there in the trauma-related picture condition, F = 2.26, p = .11, 
ηp2 = .08.  
For comparison, we repeated the 5 (phase) by 3 (group) repeated measures ANOVA for 
parietal alpha asymmetry scores. This revealed a similar phase by group interaction, F (8,204) 
= 2.83, ε= .71,  p = .014, ηp2 = .10. Follow-up ANOVAs indicated that there only was a 
group difference in the resting state,  F (2,51) = 3.39, p = .041, ηp2 = .12, but not in any of the 
other phases, all ps > .54. In the resting state, control participants had lower parietal 
asymmetry scores than the PTSD group, while there were no differences among the two 
trauma-exposed groups. Thus, the deviant resting frontal asymmetry scores of the control 
group was also reflected in parietal alpha asymmetry, whereas this was not the case during the 
emotion induction phases. Importantly, the two trauma-exposed groups did not differ in 
parietal asymmetry, irrespective of measurement phase.  
 Figure 3. Frontal asymmetry scores per group and condition. Asterisks indicate a significant 
simple effect of group. Error bars indicate standard errors.  
 
Correlation analyses in trauma-exposed participants. In line with the PTSD study by 
Rabe, Beauducel, et al. (2006), we assessed the correlations between symptoms and frontal 
asymmetry scores based on the resting state measurement, as well as using baseline-corrected 
activation asymmetry scores during the emotion induction blocks. Because frontal asymmetry 
scores differed significantly during neutral picture viewing between PTSD and no-PTSD 
participants, we used resting-state frontal asymmetry scores as the baseline condition. Thus, 
we subtracted resting state frontal asymmetry scores from the asymmetries during neutral, 
positive, negative, and trauma-related picture viewing. The derived scores reflect activation 
asymmetry, whereby higher scores indicate stronger left-sided frontal activation (i.e., right-
sided increase in alpha power) in response to picture viewing. The direct linear associations 
between these scores and PTSD symptom are summarized in Table 4. As can be seen, 
relatively more left-sided activation in the negative condition correlated with lower scores on 
all retrospective PTSD scales (except for intrusion-related rumination). In the trauma-related 
condition, trends indicate a more specific association with re-experiencing symptoms, and 
left-sided activation was significantly associated with the emotional intensity of intrusions and 
of the trauma-related image.  
For comparison, we repeated the correlation analyses for parietal asymmetry scores (see 
Table S3, supplemental materials). Resting parietal asymmetry was not significantly related to 
any of the outcomes, and there were no associations with retrospective PTSD symptoms or 
diary outcomes. However, correlations emerged between more left-sided parietal activation 
during the emotion provocation task and rumination and negative appraisal of intrusions, as 
well as with subjective rumination and emotional intensity while viewing the trauma-related 
picture. These findings suggest that the associations with PTSD symptoms and diary 
outcomes in Table 4 are specific to asymmetric activation at frontal sites, while those with 
ruminative responses to intrusions and emotional intensity of the trauma image are not.  
--- insert Table 4 about here --- 
  
Table 4. Correlations between frontal asymmetry scores and PTSD-related outcomes 
Measure Resting Neutral Positive Negative Trauma 
Correlations with retrospective measures (n = 38) 
PCL score -.04 -.15 -.15 -.47* -.24 
PSS-SR Total -.06 -.26 -.24 -.53** -.25 
   Re-Experiencing .12 -.42* -.29 -.54** -.39† 
   Avoidance -.14 -.14 -.11 -.42* -.11 
   Hyper-arousal -.08 -.20 -.28 -.45* -.23 
RIQ – Rumination .14 -.13 .10 -.14 -.14 
RIQ – Neg. appraisal .05 -.23 -.09 -.57** -.33 
Correlations with diary outcomes (n = 38) 
Intrusions Total .08 -.33 -.14 -.37† -.32 
   Image intrusions .07 -.31 -.13 -.32 -.22 
   Thought intrusions .16 -.29 -.15 -.37† -.39† 
Distress .02 -.35 -.04 -.34 -.34 
Emotional intensity .20 -.42* -.16 -.45* -.49** 
Physical reaction .19 -.25 -.31 -.43* -.35 
Correlations with subjective responses to trauma-related image (n = 39) 
Rumination -.03 -.23 .02 -.26 -.36† 
Emotional intensity .41* -.32 -.22 -.33 -.50** 
Physical reaction .23 -.11 .02 -.24 -.40* 
Distress .28 -.13 .05 -.19 -.29 
Note. PCL = PTSD Checklist (Civilian version); PSS-SR = PTSD Symptom Scale – Self-
report; RIQ = Response to Intrusions Questionnaire. Alpha was adjusted for multiple testing 
with 17 dependent variables and for the average correlation among the dependent variables (r 
= .49).  
† p < .024 (α = 0.10); * p < .012 (α = 0.05); ** p < .002 (α = 0.01) 
 
Valence and arousal responses to intrusions. To explore whether frontal asymmetry 
scores were associated with levels or time course of valence or arousal following an intrusion, 
we performed repeated-measures ANCOVAs with time (3: immediate, +15 min, +30 min) as 
within-subjects factor, baseline valence or arousal levels as a covariate, and frontal 
asymmetry scores as a covariate, focussing on potential main or interaction effects involving 
frontal asymmetry. For the valence analyses, there were no interaction effects with resting or 
activation asymmetry scores from the emotion provocation task, all Fs (2,48) < 0.70, ps > .45, 
ηp2 <.03, and no main effects, all  Fs (1,24) < 1.93, ps > .18, ηp2s <.07.  
Also for arousal, there were no interaction effects, all Fs (2,48) < 2.47, ps > .11, ηp2 
<.09, and no main effects, all  Fs (1,24) < 0.35, ps > .56, ηp2s < .02, with the exception of 
activation asymmetry during neutral picture viewing, which interacted with time, F (2,48) = 
11.50,  p < .001, ηp2 = .32. Within-subjects contrasts indicated that the interaction was linear, 
F (1,24) = 16.58,  p < .001, ηp2 = .41, which was further supported by the finding that more 
left-sided activation asymmetry during neutral picture viewing correlated with higher arousal 
levels immediately following an intrusion, r (27) = .40, p = .040, while there was no 
association after 15 min (r = -.01, p = .95), and a non-significant negative correlation after 30 
min (r = -.23, p = .24). Thus, overall, resting frontal asymmetry appeared to have no link with 
affect levels following intrusive memories, while we found only limited and suggestive 
evidence that left-sided activation during the emotion provocation task is associated with the 
post-intrusion time course of arousal levels.  
Uniqueness of the effects to PTSD. In order to test whether the associations between 
resting and activation frontal asymmetries with PTSD symptoms are shared with symptoms of 
anxiety depression, and overall psychopathology, we ran correlation analyses with STAI-T, 
BDI-II, and BSI scores. As can be seen in Table 5, higher left-sided frontal activation in the 
negative picture condition again predicted lower levels of symptoms, while the effects in the 
trauma-related condition were similar in direction but not statistically significant. Meanwhile, 
negative affect levels prior to the EEG measurement were associated with lower activation 
asymmetry scores throughout the emotion induction task, and especially so in the negative 
picture condition.  
Based on these findings, it is possible that the associations described in Table 4 do not 
reflect effects that are unique to PTSD, but in part reflect effects that are shared with anxiety, 
depression, and other common symptoms of psychopathology. To address this possibility, we 
performed partial correlation analyses, correcting for STAI-T, BDI-II, and BSI scores 
(including only participants with complete data on all questionnaires). The results are 
summarized in Table 6. As can be seen, several partial correlations were still statistically 
significant and align with the zero-order correlations. The effects for retrospective measures 
were reduced in size and largely non-significant. In the intrusion diary, activation 
asymmetries in response to the neutral and the trauma-related picture remained significant 
predictors of the emotional intensity during intrusions. Consistent with this finding, activation 
asymmetry scores in the trauma-related condition also predicted lower emotional intensity 
ratings directly after viewing the trauma-related picture.  
--- insert Table 5 about here --- 
--- insert Table 6 about here --- 
Table 5. Correlations with anxiety, depression, psychopathology, and current affect levels 
Measure Resting Neutral Positive Negative Trauma 
Correlations with psychopathology other than PTSD (n = 38) 
STAI-T -.19 -.09 -.17 -.47** -.33† 
BDI-II .12 -.15 -.10 -.52** -.20 
BSI .05 -.13 -.28 -.53** -.30 
Correlations with state negative affect prior to the resting state measurement (n = 39) 
PANAS – NA  .28 -.43* -.31† -.65** -.52** 
Note. STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II; BSI = 
Brief Symptom Inventory; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect schedule, state version; 
Alpha level was adjusted multiple testing with four dependent variables and for the average 
correlation among dependent variables (r = .68). 
† p < .064 (α = 0.10); * p < .032 (α = 0.05); ** p < .006 (α = 0.01).   
Table 6. Partial correlations (df = 33) with PTSD-related outcomes, corrected for trait anxiety 
(STAI-T), depression (BDI-II), and overall psychopathology (BSI) 
Measure Resting Neutral Positive Negative Trauma 
Partial correlations with retrospective measures 
PCL score -.13 -.06 .19 .06 .10 
PSS-SR Total -.17 -.26 -.14 -.18 -.04 
   Re-Experiencing .14 -.47* -.26 -.26 -.30 
   Avoidance -.27 -.05 .03 -.06 .13 
   Hyper-arousal -.13 -.15 -.17 -.12 -.01 
RIQ – Rumination -.09 -.06 .22 .14 -.06 
RIQ – Neg. appraisal .15 -.23 .01 -.31 -.21 
Partial correlations with diary outcomes 
Intrusions Total .10 -.31 -.05 -.10 -.21 
   Image intrusions .08 -.28 -.05 -.08 -.10 
   Thought intrusions .21 -.26 -.02 -.05 -.29 
Distress .06 -.35 -.04 -.09 -.29 
Emotional intensity .30 -.43* -.18 -.25 -.47* 
Physical reaction .23 -.22 -.33 -.28 -.29 
Partial correlations with subjective responses to trauma-related image 
Rumination -.10 -.23 .14 -.12 -.33 
Emotional intensity .37 -.34 -.14 -.26 -.53** 
Physical reaction .21 -.16 .08 -.16 -.41† 
Distress .30 -.19 -.02 -.11 -.34 
Note. PCL = PTSD Checklist (Civilian version); PSS-SR = PTSD Symptom Scale – Self-
report; RIQ = Response to Intrusions Questionnaire. Alpha was adjusted for multiple testing 
with 17 dependent variables and for the average correlation among the dependent variables (r 
= .49). 
† p < .024 (α = 0.10); * p < .012 (α = 0.05); ** p < .002 (α = 0.01) 
Symptom validity. Finally, we tested whether symptom over-reporting tendencies 
might have affected the results. Therefore, we applied a conservative cut-off score for the 
SIMS and defined participants with a score higher than 16 as potentially displaying over-
reporting tendencies (Merckelbach & Smith, 2003). Based on this criterion, we excluded five 
participants, and we also removed a sixth participant for whom no SIMS data were available. 
We then repeated the main correlation analyses that are reported in Table 4 in the remaining 
32 participants. The results can be inspected in Table S1 (supplemental materials). Strikingly, 
despite the considerable reduction in statistical power, these analyses show that virtually all 
effects of activation asymmetry during negative and trauma-related picture viewing increase 
in size. Therefore, in this subsample, overall PTSD symptoms are highly correlated with 
activation asymmetry during negative picture viewing (PCL: r = -.55; PSS-SR: r = -.60; ps <= 
.001), and also in the trauma-related picture condition (PCL: r = -.43; PSS-SR: r = -.41; ps <= 
.019). Moreover, left-sided frontal activation in the trauma-related condition now correlated 
significantly with fewer re-experiencing symptoms (r = -.47) and intrusive memories (r = -
.42). Thus, symptom over-reporting tendencies in some participants are highly unlikely to be 
driving the effects of frontal asymmetry reported in this paper, and might even have 
dampened true associations.  
 
  
Discussion 
The present study addressed frontal EEG asymmetry as a potential marker of PTSD 
symptoms in trauma victims. Replicating prior EEG studies in traumatized samples (for 
review, see Meyer, Smeets, et al., 2015), we explored the association between PTSD 
symptoms and frontal asymmetry at rest and in response to emotional provocation, including 
a condition where participants viewed a trauma-related picture. Our study extends prior 
findings by supplementing retrospective measures with ambulatory symptom assessment and 
a laboratory provocation, providing a closer look at various PTSD symptoms in daily life 
(Chun, 2016). A particular interest was in re-experiencing symptoms, including intrusive 
trauma memories and their ensuing cognitive-emotional reactions. Moreover, we included 
measures of general psychopathology and symptom exaggeration tendencies to assess 
whether potential effects would be specific to PTSD and robust against reporting bias.  
The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, our results replicate and extend 
prior findings (Rabe et al., 2008; Rabe, Zöllner, Maercker, & Karl, 2006) and support the 
view that provocation-induced frontal activation asymmetry is more closely linked with PTSD 
symptoms than resting state asymmetry, which was unrelated to all retrospective symptoms. 
Second, higher left-sided frontal activation in response to a negative picture most consistently 
predicted fewer PTSD symptoms, both assessed in the intrusion diary, the emotion 
provocation task, and retrospectively. It was similarly associated with lower levels of 
depression, anxiety, and general symptoms of psychopathology, and partial correlation 
analyses correcting for these factors revealed that these effects are likely to be shared between 
PTSD and other mental disorders. Third, left-sided frontal activation in response to an 
individually chosen trauma-related picture did not show similarly consistent associations with 
retrospective PTSD symptoms, but was more specifically associated with fewer re-
experiencing symptoms. Notably, it predicted less intense responses to intrusions and in 
response to viewing the trauma-related picture, even when corrected for other symptoms of 
psychopathology and for symptom over-reporting tendencies. However, valence and arousal 
levels immediately following intrusions appeared to be unrelated to this marker. Fourth, and 
more surprisingly, we also found that activation asymmetry in response to a neutral picture 
had similar relationships with various symptoms, albeit less consistently across outcome 
measures. Finally, group analyses that compared trauma survivors with and without a 
diagnosis of PTSD with a healthy, trauma-free control group revealed that trauma victims 
without PTSD (i.e., relatively more resilient individuals) displayed more left-sided frontal 
activation in response to the negative picture than victims with PTSD and controls. In line 
with the correlation analyses, a similar pattern emerged for the neutral picture condition, but, 
unexpectedly, not for the trauma-related picture condition. Meanwhile, and contrary to our 
expectation, controls had lower left-sided activity at rest than the trauma-exposed groups.  
In general, our results largely replicate Rabe, Beauducel, et al. (2006), who found that 
right-sided frontal activation in response to a trauma picture was associated with PTSD 
symptoms, depression, anxiety, and negative affect levels, in trauma victims who had 
experienced a motor vehicle accident. Our results also align well with findings of increased 
right-sided frontal activation during anxiety provocation in individuals with social phobia 
(Davidson, Marshall, Tomarken, & Henriques, 2000) and panic disorder (Wiedemann et al., 
1999). We extend these prior findings by showing that similar associations exist with PTSD 
re-experiencing symptoms in daily life, including the number and intensity of intrusive 
memories, in individuals with mixed traumatic experiences. Moreover, by including the SIMS 
as a symptom validity scale, we were able to demonstrate that the associations reported here 
are not carried by individuals with a tendency towards symptom over-reporting. Taken 
together, the present findings suggest that frontal activation asymmetry during emotional 
provocation can serve as a biomarker that is informative about PTSD symptom levels, and 
also specifically linked with the intensity of re-experiencing symptoms.  
Unlike Rabe, Beauducel, et al. (2006), we found frontal activation asymmetry to 
correlate with PTSD symptoms also in the negative picture condition, and to some degree 
even in the neutral picture condition. Although we used the same picture stimuli as Rabe and 
colleagues for the neutral, positive, and negative emotion conditions, procedural differences 
with their study may account for this disparity. That is, these authors included only victims of 
motor vehicle accidents, and therefore used the same trauma-related picture for all 
participants. In contrast, we selected the trauma-related picture individually using each 
participant’s description of their index traumatic experience. Since participants were fully 
aware of the type of stimuli that would be presented, this may have led to stronger 
anticipatory fear, knowing that they would be reminded of their personal traumatic 
experience. Arguably, this anticipation effect might have exerted its influence most strongly 
in the neutral picture condition, In other words, even though participants viewed a neutral 
picture, this condition appears unlikely to have induced an affectively neutral state. This 
interpretation also aligns with this the finding that there were no significant group or 
correlation effects at all for the positive picture condition.  
It is also noteworthy that frontal activation asymmetry in the negative picture condition 
was strongly associated with almost all measures of PTSD symptoms, except for the acute 
rumination, physical reactions, and distress caused by viewing the trauma-related image. 
Interestingly, analyses further revealed that a large part of these associations are shared with 
depression, anxiety, and general psychopathology, suggesting that they do not reflect effects 
that are unique to PTSD. In contrast, activation asymmetry during the trauma-related image 
tended to be associated more specifically with re-experiencing symptoms in daily life and in 
response to viewing the image, and these effects tended to remain significant when corrected 
for other symptoms of psychopathology. Therefore, our data suggest that frontal activation 
asymmetry during emotion provocation can inform about a wide range of psychopathological 
symptoms, whereas it can also more specifically predict re-experiencing symptoms when 
measured while participants view an idiosyncratic, trauma-related picture.  
From a theoretical point of view, it is noteworthy that provocation-induced frontal 
asymmetries in the negative and the trauma-related conditions were associated with hyper-
arousal related PTSD symptoms, including the emotional intensity associated with traumatic 
memories. Some of these effects were also evident in parietal alpha asymmetries. 
Interestingly, the valence-arousal model of hemispheric asymmetry (Heller et al., 1997; 
Nitschke et al., 1999) proposes that anxious arousal is characterized by right parietal 
activation, whereas frontal asymmetry would more specifically reflect anxious apprehension. 
Accordingly, right-sided parietal activation patterns might play a role in the associations 
between frontal asymmetry and hyper-arousal symptoms. However, this view is challenged by 
the finding that parietal asymmetries were only linked with the emotional intensity in 
response to viewing the trauma-related picture, and not with the emotional intensity of 
intrusive memories. Furthermore, parietal asymmetries were associated with ruminative 
responses and with negative appraisal of intrusions. Taken together, our findings provide only 
partial support for the valence-arousal model, which warrants further critical investigation of 
the regional specificity of asymmetry effects.  
Another finding that may inspire future research is that trauma-exposed participants 
with stronger left-sided frontal activity at rest displayed more emotionally intense traumatic 
memories, and that left-sided activation asymmetry during neutral picture viewing tended to 
correlate with higher arousal levels immediately following an intrusion. These results appear 
to contravene the overall pattern in our results (i.e., left-sided frontal activity predicting fewer 
PTSD symptoms), yet they align with the finding that left-sided activity can be associated 
with both stronger and weaker physiological down-regulation of affective responses (e.g., 
Meyer et al., 2014a). Indeed, both the left and right hemispheres can be involved in increases 
and decreases of autonomic nervous system and stress hormonal responses (Kline, in press; 
Miller, Crocker, Spielberg, Infantolino, & Heller, 2013). Therefore, an explanation for these 
unexpected findings may require a more fine-grained analysis of neural and cognitive-
emotional processes that are captured by measurements of frontal alpha asymmetry. The same 
is true for the finding that trauma-free controls exhibited more right-sided frontal and parietal 
activity at rest, which is at odds with prior findings (e.g., Rabe, Beauducel, et al., 2006). 
Indeed, in line with the so-called capability model of frontal asymmetry (Coan et al., 2006), 
these findings underline that the resting state measurements (and our “neutral” emotion 
condition) represent relatively uncontrolled experimental contexts. Future studies should thus 
attempt to replace them by conditions that better control individual or group differences on 
affective or motivational dimensions.  
Finally, our results suggest that frontal asymmetry may be linked to re-experiencing 
symptoms, including intrusive memories. The theoretical link between intrusions and models 
of frontal asymmetry still remains elusive, since intrusive memories are typically thought to 
result from encoding, consolidation, or retrieval processes (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & 
Burgess, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Rubin, Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008) that make traumatic 
memories more or less accessible (e.g., Bisby et al., 2010; Meyer, Krans, van Ast, & Smeets, 
in press; Meyer et al., 2013). However, it is possible that the association between frontal 
asymmetry and intrusions is mediated by negative appraisal of intrusions, which may result 
from stronger withdrawal tendencies and serve as a maintaining factor of re-experiencing 
symptoms (Ehlers, 2010). More speculatively, direct associations could exist between frontal 
asymmetry and intrusions; indeed, left frontal activity has been proposed to be involved in the 
context-dependent activation of memories through pathways to the hippocampus (Kline, in 
press; Meyer, Smeets, et al., 2015). Therefore, longitudinal (and/or experimental) studies are 
required to establish the precise role of frontal asymmetry in re-experiencing symptoms (also 
see Ehring, Kleim, & Ehlers, 2011). 
The following methodological aspects should be kept in mind when interpreting our 
findings. First, we selected a trauma-related picture for each participant individually. 
Therefore, it is possible that we were more successful at activating traumatic memories for 
some participants than for others, which may have introduced unwanted variance and have 
overshadowed potential effects. However, since PTSD is characterized by poor stimulus 
discrimination and by a wide range of environmental stimuli that can easily trigger re-
experiencing symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), it is likely that our emotion provocation task 
was able to induce more trauma-specific re-experiencing symptoms in those participants who 
also display more PTSD symptoms in daily life. Moreover, on average, all trauma-exposed 
individuals indicated that the picture strongly reminded them of their own traumatic 
experience.  
Second, it must be noted that we only used one stimulus for each emotion category (e.g., 
a barking dog for negative emotions), which limits the generalizability of our findings to the 
specific emotions that were induced. Relatedly, it is important to keep in mind that the 
comparison among emotional conditions was exploratory and still requires further replication. 
Third, replication is also warranted due to the limitations imposed by our sample size. That is, 
we found several relatively large effects in the r = .41 to .57 range (which are comparable to 
prior findings; e.g., Rabe, Beauducel, et al., 2006), while somewhat smaller effects may have 
gone undetected due to limited statistical power (e.g., see the emerging trends in Table 4). 
This argument is especially relevant for our analyses on the time course of affect levels 
following everyday intrusions, which only included a subset of the participants. For ethical 
reasons, we allowed our participants to omit the Affect Grids on the smartphone when this 
would be experienced as too burdensome. As a result, the measured responses might represent 
only relatively mild symptoms, and we could use only a proportion of our participants in these 
analyses. Therefore, the question whether frontal asymmetry might affect the time course of 
affective responding to trauma memories remains to be investigated further in future studies.  
Implications and conclusions 
The present study aligns with an emerging consensus in the literature that frontal 
asymmetry is especially informative about individual differences in psychopathology when 
measured in response to an emotional provocation (Allen & Reznik, 2015; Coan et al., 2006). 
Specifically, this implies that future studies into the role of frontal asymmetry in PTSD should 
include measurements during symptom provocation. Furthermore, on a methodological level, 
our study has demonstrated the benefits of including ambulatory measures to capture PTSD-
specific re-experiencing symptoms, and of including a scale that measures symptom over-
reporting tendencies to ensure the validity of all other assessments.  
Our findings suggest that state-dependent changes in frontal asymmetry could 
eventually serve as a biological marker of PTSD symptoms. While replication is still 
warranted, practical implications can be envisioned. For instance, a next step would be to 
investigate whether frontal activation asymmetry during an emotional provocation may serve 
as a predictor of the development of PTSD symptoms in individuals who have just 
experienced a psychological trauma. Furthermore, research should address the question how 
the assessment of frontal asymmetry can be optimized in such a way that it can be used for 
diagnostic purposes, or to monitor treatment progress. Furthermore, our results can inspire 
neuromodulation studies, where frontal activation asymmetry could be a promising target. For 
instance, in EEG neurofeedback, parameters of ongoing brain activity are used as the basis for 
real-time feedback to the participant, who can thereby learn to self-regulate their own brain 
activity. Indeed, neurofeedback has already been used to train frontal asymmetry at rest 
(Allen, Harmon-Jones, & Cavender, 2001; Peeters, Ronner, Bodar, van Os, & Lousberg, 
2014; Quaedflieg et al., 2016). Importantly, based on our results, it appears particularly 
promising to apply neurofeedback for PTSD patients during a symptom provocation condition 
(e.g., while viewing a negative trauma-related picture), rather than at rest. Finally, studying 
frontal activation asymmetry in response to symptom provocation might also advance our 
theoretical understanding of PTSD (Meyer, Smeets, et al., 2015). To this end, it will be crucial 
to combine neuroimaging methods to elucidate the neural underpinnings of asymmetric brain 
activity during symptomatic states, for instance by combining EEG with fMRI in varying 
motivational contexts (e.g., see Gorka, Phan, & Shankman, 2015). That way, models of 
asymmetry can be updated and serve to inform neuropsychological models of PTSD.    
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